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Indiana's Sunday Alcoholic Beverage Sales:
Regulation Without Justification
It is axiomatic that the function of a legislature is to create new
laws and repeal unnecessary ones. Moreover, a corollary duty of the
legislature is to be cognizant of the ramifications of its actions. The
history of Indiana's regulation of Sunday activities, both commer-
cial and private, is an excellent example of the problems which may
arise when too little attention is given to the relationship between
mutually supportive laws which have developed by similar meth-
ods.' Prior to 1977, Indiana prohibited most commercial and many
recreational pursuits on Sundays pursuant to the closing law. 2 In
1977 the closing law was repealed.3 The repeal of the closing law has
produced potential constitutional issues in the regulation of Sunday
sales of alcoholic beverages. Historically, the development of Sun-
day liquor regulations paralleled that of the closing law and was
supported by it. The 1977 repeal of the closing law effectively re-
moved this justification for liquor regulations.' The legislative in-
tent in the area of the liquor regulations, following repeal of the
I This note focuses on the issues involved in the regulation of Sunday sales of alcoholic
beverages. There are similar issues present in other Sunday regulations. For example, a
barber may have his license suspended for violating Indiana Code § 35-1-86-1 (1976) (repealed
1977), see IND. CODE § 25-7-1-16(8) (1976), despite the fact that this section was the closing
law which was repealed in 1977. See note 2 & accompanying text infra. In other words, a
barber's license is conditioned on compliance with a non-existent statute. The repeal of the
closing law created a legislative gap which has yet to be filled. It is this type of issue and the
inaction on the part of the legislature which present potential problems like those discussed
in this note. For a discussion of Sunday motor vehicle sales prior to the repeal of the closing
law, see Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E.2d 808 (1958).
2 Whoever being over fourteen (14) years of age, is found on the first day of the
week, commonly called Sunday, rioting, hunting, quarreling, at common
labor, or engaged in his usual vocation, works of charity and necessity only
excepted, shall be fimed not less than one dollar ($1.00) nor more than ten dollars
($10.00); but nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect such as
conscientiously observe the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath, travelers,
and those engaged in conveying them, families removing, keepers of toll bridges
and toll gates, ferrymen acting as such and persons engaged in the publication
and distribution of news, or persons engaged in playing the game of baseball or
ice hockey after one o'clock P.M. and not less than one thousand (1,000) feet
distant from any established house of worship or permanent church structure
used for religious services, or any public hospital or private hospital erected prior
to the passage of this act.
IND. CODE § 35-1-86-1 (1976) (repealed 1977).
An Act to amend IC 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 24, 25, 33, 34, and 35 as part of a revision of
the criminal law, Pub. L. No. 26, § 25, 1977 Ind. Acts 160.
'See notes 79-85 & accompanying text infra.
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closing law, is problematic. The current situation is subject to con-
stitutional attack because the classification schemes which serve as
the basis of the Sunday liquor sales restrictions are irrational and
without apparent legislative purpose. Because this situation has
gone unnoticed, or if noticed, uncorrected by the legislature, the
justification for the Sunday liquor laws must be reexamined and
clarified.
This note surveys the origin of the closing laws and traces their
development in Indiana. It analyzes the rationale of the Sunday
liquor laws, as traditionally related to and dependent upon the clos-
ing laws, and demonstrates that the demise of the closing laws left
the liquor laws unsupported by any justification, particularly in
light of amendments to the Sunday regulations. It argues that the
Sunday.liquor laws, as they exist today, are subject to constitutional
challenges based on Indiana's privileges and immunities clause or
the 'equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Therefore, the General Assembly is ob-
ligated to act to cure the infirmities of the laws.
DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSING LAWS AND REGULATION OF LIQUOR
SALES
Sunday Closing Laws: Historical Sketch
The origin of Sunday closing laws has been traced to the Emperor
Justinian in 321 A.D.' A civil edict with religious overtones was
issued which created confusion regarding the rationale for the law
even at its inception.6 During their early development, these laws
acquired a blend of "Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Roman, [and] Ger-
manic" elements.7 The Hebrew contribution to the closing law,
based on biblical commandment, was of a moral flavor.' This influ-
ence eventually resulted in a bifurcated rationale for the closing
laws. One aspect of the rationale rested on the premise that, apart
from any religious considerations, Sunday was a necessary day of
rest.' The second aspect explicitly recognized closing laws to be
See Rosenbaum v. State, 131 Ark. 251, 199 S.W. 388 (1917).
See J. AYER, SOURCEBOOK FOR ANCIENT CHURcH HISTORY 284 (1913); A. JOHNSON & F. YOST,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (1969).
Harrison v. McLeod, 141 Fla. 804, 194 So. 247 (1940).
"'Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days you shall labor, and do all your
work; but the seventh day... you shall not do any work... ; for ... the Lord ... rested
the seventh day . . . .'" Exodus 20:8-11 (Revised Standard Version).
I For cases describing the need to prevent excessive labor practices, thus justifying regula-
tion of labor and commercial transactions, see note 57 & accompanying text infra.
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required by Christian principles."0
The mid-centuries of English history witnessed significant expan-
sion of the scope of the laws. The purpose of the laws was expressly
stated in 1448" and reemphasized in 1627.12 Sunday was a day of
worship and must be kept holy; certain conduct and activities did
injury to God when performed on Sunday. To avoid this sacrilege,
restrictions were placed on selected activities. 3 It was clear that,
aside from any governmental desire to protect the people from ex-
cessive labor by forcing a day of rest upon them, the laws were based
on a religious mandate.
Against this backdrop of religious laws the New World was colo-
nized. Predominate among the people settling in New England were
victims of religious intolerance in the "old country."" They came
seeking new land and new freedom. Yet the closing laws enacted in
New England were far more extensive than those of England. 5
The closing laws were continually carried westward by migrating
settlers. During the eighteenth century the Northwest Territory was
carved out of the wilderness as the United States expanded its bor-
ders westward. The territory was governed by the Ordinance of
1787.11 The general closing law enacted under the Ordinance reas-
serted the religious rationale: "The christian world have set apart
the first day of the week, as a day of rest from common labors and
pursuits; it is therefore enjoined that all servile labor, works of ne-
cessity and charity excepted, be wholly abstained on said day.' 17
Not surprisingly, each subsequent stage in Indiana history saw the
reenactment of a general closing law. In 1800 the Indiana Territory
was severed from the Northwest Territory. The new government
quickly passed a closing law, ostensibly to prevent vice and immo-
1, See A. JOHNSON & F. YOST, supra note 6, at 222-27; W. JOHNS, DATELINE SUNDAY, U.S.A.
95-102 (1967).
" Certain days wherein fairs and markets ought not to be kept, 1448, 27 Hen. 6, c. 5.
12 An act for punishing diverse abuses committed on the Lord's day, called Sunday, 1625,
1 Car. 1, c. 1.
13 An act for the better observation of the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, 1676, 29
Car. 2, c. 7 (the forerunner of Indiana's closing law); Upon which days wool may be shown in
the staple, and in which not, 1359, 28 Edw. 3, c. 14 (prohibiting. the showing of wool on
Sunday). The closing law earned its name by forcing the closing of businesses and commercial
enterprises on Sunday.
W. JoHNS, supra note 10, at 12-14.
" Id. at 1-7. An excellent example of the irrational nature of the laws was the penalty
for kissing one's wife in public on Sunday-a whipping. Id. at 6.
11 For a history of the government of the territory see NORTHWEST TERRITORY CELEBRATION
COMMIrrEE, HISTORY OF ORDINANCE OF 1787 AND OLD NORTHWEST TERRITORY 16 (1937).
11 Laws of Governor and Judges under the Ordinance of 1787, from July 25th, 1788 to July
2d, 1791, A law respecting crimes and punishments, ch. 6, § 22, 1787-1802 Northwest Terri-
tory Laws 92 (1788).
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rality.!5 When statehood was conferred upon the territory in 1816,
Indiana responded by establishing its own closing law, which was
also designed to prevent certain "immoral practices.""9 By 1905 the
Indiana General Assembly had formulated a closing law which,
except for minor amendments in 190921 and 1941,2 remained in
effect until 1977.2
Sunday Liquor Sales Restrictions
The government of the Northwest Territory addressed liquor li-
censing as well as Sunday closing laws. The licensing law, in con-
trast to later restrictive measures, required a tavernkeeper to
provide "liquors of good and salutary quality" or risk revocation of
his license.24 In the 1816 closing law, Sunday sales of intoxicating
liquors were restricted, 25 but sales to travelers were excepted from
the prohibition. 26 However, acceptance of such laws was not unani-
mous nor without controversy.
In the early 1800's the proponents of liquor sales viewed whiskey
as a necessity possessing wonderful medicinal and curative powers."
Further, religious leaders did not uniformly oppose whiskey and
many were associated with its use;2" a church-oriented newspaper
publicly opposed abstinence in 1841 as contrary to the teachings of
the Bible.29 Temperance movements gradually gained influence,
however, and the use of intoxicating liquors fell out of vogue." In
1855 the temperance forces gained control of the General Assembly3'
11 An Act for the prevention of Vice and Immorality, ch. 37, § 1, 1807 Ind. Acts 199. This
closing law remained virtually intact in the closing law established by the First General
Assembly of Indiana.
11 An Act to prevent certain immoral practices, ch. 32, §§ 1, 2, 1816-17 Ind. Acts 165 (1817)
(repealed 1905). The state's first closing law set the tone for the versions which would follow
in later years; substantial portions of it appeared in the 1905 version, the basic closing law
which survived until 1977.
An act concerning public offenses, ch. 169, § 467, 1905 Ind. Acts 584 (repealed 1977).
21 Act of March 8, 1909, ch. 175, § 1, 1909 Ind. Acts 436 (repealed 1977).
2 Act of March 3, 1941, ch. 75, § 1, 1941 Ind. Acts 191 (repealed 1977).
2 See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
24 An Act granting licenses to merchants, traders and tavern-keepers, Laws of 1792, ch. 24,
§ 9, 1787-1802 Northwest Territory Laws 114 (1792).
23 An Act to prevent certain immoral practices, ch. 32, § 1, 1816-17 Ind. Acts 165 (1817)
(repealed 1905).
2Id. § 2.
21 T. GOODWIN, LIQUOR LAWS AND DECISIoNs 4 (1883).
Id. at 5-6.
2 Id. at 6.
o Id. at 5-9.
31 Id. at 13.
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and passed a state prohibition law.32 The force of the law was
quickly limited by the courts,s and it was repealed in 1858.11
The General Assembly nonetheless continued its attempts to reg-
ulate issuance of licenses for retail sales of liquor. Nearly every
General Assembly from 1816 through 1979 made some modification
of the regulation of liquor permits and licenses.35 The Sunday excep-
tion for travelers was eliminated in 1853,38 and closing hours for
permissible sale days were instituted in the late 1880's.7 In 1917
Indiana enacted a second prohibition" which was followed by a
nationwide prohibition. 9 After nearly fifteen years these efforts were
deemed a failure and repealed." The legislature turned again to
license regulation, and by 1971 the current closing hours were estab-
lished.4
The mid-1970's saw major revisions in Indiana's Sunday closing
and liquor lawh. With the repeal of the exception for Sunday travel-
ers in 1853, Indiana made it unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors on
Sunday.2 Then, on February 13, 1973, Public Law 5513 was enacted
as a new title of the Indiana Code compiling all laws and regulations
32An Act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors,
except in the cases therein named, and to repeal all former acts inconsistent therewith, and
for the suppression of Intemperance, ch. 105, § 1, 1855 Ind. Acts 209 (repealed 1858).
11 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855). The court found major portions of the law to be
unconstitutional since it permitted a state-held monopoly in the liquor industry.
An Act to repeal an act entitled "An Act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of spiri-
tuous and intoxicating liquors, except in the cases therein named, and to repeal all former
acts inconsistent therewith, and for the suppression of Intemperance," ch. 15, § 1, 1858 Ind.
Acts 40.
3 Modifications of requirements to obtain a retailer's permit were typical of legislative
efforts. E.g., An Act to amend an act, entitled an act to license and regulate taverns, ch. 36,
§ 2, 1820-21 Ind. Acts 92 (1821); An act to authorize persons to retail spiritous liquors without
the requisition of a tavern keeper, ch. 63, § 2, 1827-28 Ind. Acts 79 (1828).
An Act to regulate the retailing of Spirituous Liquors, and for the suppression of evils
arising therefrom, ch. 66, § 6, 1853 Ind. Acts 87.
3 Act of March 17, 1875, ch. 13, §§ 3, 9, 1875 Ind. Acts, 49th Spec. Sess. 55. The precise
closing hours were frequently modified.
u An Act prohibiting the manufacture, sale, gift, advertisement or transportation of intoxi-
cating liquor except for certain purpose and under certain conditions, ch. 4, § 4, 1917 Ind.
Acts 15. In 1919, Indiana resolved to adopt the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution
which established National Prohibition. S.J. Res. 2, ch. 236, 1919 Ind. Acts 846.
3' U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Indiana adopted a new licensing law. An Act concerning
alcoholic beverages, and declaring an emergency, ch. 80, 1933 Ind. Acts 492.
, IND. CODE § 7.1-5-10-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
4 Sunday liquor sales were proscribed, but express exceptions were provided for sales for
"sacramental, mechanical, chemical, medicinal, or culinary purposes." An act to regulate the
retailing of Spirituous Liquors, and for the suppression of evils arising therefrom, ch. 66, § 1,
1853 Ind. Acts 87.
3 IND. CODE tit. 7.1 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
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concerning alcoholic beverages. On May 1, 1973, Public Law 60"
amended the new title. The amendment allows restaurants to serve
intoxicating liquors by the drink on Sunday if for consumption on
the premises, provided certain criteria are satisfied.45 This restric-
tion on Sunday sales, with the recent amendment liberalizing the
regulations, has been retained despite the repeal of the closing law
in 1977.
It was this 1977 repeal which first necessitated focusing attention
on the justification for the Sunday sales restrictions. Prior to that
time, regulation of Sunday activities was in keeping with preserving
its status as a "day of rest";" however, this status was lost in 1977.11
The General Assembly emphasized this change in attitude during
the 1979 session. The law regulating boxing and wrestling exhibi-
tions4" was amended to remove the "antique" restriction on Sunday
exhibitions." Today, for reasons other than a day of rest rationale,
a few activities continue to be prohibited on Sunday;" yet, Sunday
liquor sales are restricted without benefit of any justification inde-
pendent of the repealed closing law, and as such, are subject to
constitutional challenges.
RESTRICTIONS ON SUNDAY LIQUOR SALES: IN SEARCH OF A
RATIONALE
Development of the Police Power Rationale
The religious rationale used to support the Sunday restrictions
was express.' A police power rationale only became necessary after
" IND. CODE §§ 7.1-3-16.5-1 to -6 (1976).
To qualify for the supplemental retailers' permit the restaurant must demonstrate that
it has annual gross sales of $100,000.00, 50% of which are food sales. Id. § 7.1-3-16.5-2.
46 See cases cited notes 55-57 infra.
'T In addition to the repeal of the closing law, Public Law 26 repealed the prohibition
against Sunday hunting. Act of April 11, 1977, Pub. L. No. 26, § 25, 1977 Ind. Acts 160. Other
Sunday prohibitions were retained for reasons other than a day of rest rationale. See note 50
& accompanying text infra.
IND. CODE §§ 25-9-1-5, -16, -17 (1976) (amended 1979).
" In 1979, when preparing to schedule a boxing exhibition to be held on a Sunday, the
Administrative Director of the Indiana Athletic Commission discovered what he termed an
"antique" law, which prohibited such Sunday exhibitions. Indpls. News, Jan. 6, 1979, at 13,
col. 3.
50 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-1-34-12 (1976) (civil judgment execution may not be issued on
Sunday unless plaintiff shows a compelling need); id. § 33-15-1-2 (office of the state supreme
court clerk is closed on Sunday). These provisions are sustainable due to the legislature's
control of state offices without concern for any police power justification.
11 E.g., the very title of the 1855 closing law reveals its religious orientation: An Act for
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the states ratified the first amendment,2 which, under the estab-
lishment clause, required the separation of church and state. 3 A
constitutional challenge to a state closing law based on first amend-
ment reasoning did not become possible until the Supreme Court
incorporated its guarantees into the fourteenth amendment. 4 This
extension of first amendment principles to the states necessitated a
secular response to uphold their closing laws.
The Supreme Court forewarned the states of its view of the first
amendment as early as 1884. In Soon Hing v. Crowley,5" the Court
held that "[1]aws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld,
not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion
of religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons
from the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninter-
rupted labor."" Despite this lucid declaration of a police power
rationale, attacks on the laws continued until 1961 when the Court
fully delineated the criteria for legitimacy of such laws by explicitly
requiring the states to demonstrate a police power rationale."
Determining Indiana's historical justification for the closing laws
is not easy. They have acquired an almost chameleon nature. The
legislative justification for the laws seldom has been articulated
fully. Courts generally seek to propound a rationale from the opera-
the protection of the Sabbath, and providing penalties for the desecration thereof, ch. 84, 1855
Ind. Acts 159 (repealed 1909).
" The first amendment was ratified in 1791; however, it was more than 150 years before
its guarantees were fully incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and thereby made
applicable to the states. See note 54 & accompanying text infra.
-" "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. For a discussion of this clause in respect to closing laws, see cases cited note 57
infra.
5' Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943). For earlier treatments of incorporation of first amendment guarantees, see Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
w 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
"' Id. at 710.
" In 1961 the Supreme Court heard four cases from different states challenging state
closing laws. The Court held that a religious rationale was improper, but that the laws were
sustainable pursuant to a police power rationale, regardless of the rationale once used to
support the laws. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two-Guys from Harrison-
Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
The religious origin of the closing laws were recognized in McGowan, but the Court also
found that "it is equally true that the 'Establishment Clause' does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442.
The purpose of the closing law was significant as it was found permissible for the state to
seek "to set one day apart from all others as a day of rest." Id. at 450. For a discussion of
Indiana closing law and the impact of these cases, see Note, The Constitutional Status of
the Indiana Closing Law, 37 In. L.J. 397 (1962).
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tion of the law and from its historical development. However, Indi-
ana case law concerning closing laws is of little help. In Voglesong
v. State" the closing law was challenged when it was used to convict
a defendant for engaging in his usual vocation, selling liquors, on
Sunday. The court summarily upheld the law, asserting that
"[t]he question [of the constitutionality of the closing laws] can
hardly be considered an open one. The grounds upon which such
acts are sustained have been thoroughly examined and are generally
admitted to be substantial."" As authority for this view, the court
cited only two cases, neither of which involved constitutional chal-
lenges to the law."
A constitutional challenge was again before the court in Foltz v.
State."1 The court failed to consider the constitutional challenge
adequately, and cited Voglesong as controlling. 2 In yet another con-
stitutional challenge, the court faced, for the first time in Indiana,
a challenge to the closing law based on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the Indiana Constitution"3 and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The court refused to consider
the issue, claiming that "[t]hat sentiment is too widely spread and
profound, and that policy is too firmly embedded in the laws and
in the decisions of the courts, to be overthrown."85 In effect, the issue
of the proper rationale was ignored and the closing laws were boot-
strapped into precedent: the laws existed, therefore they were ac-
cepted; ergo, they should continue to exist. The only unequivocal
statement of purpose for the laws was made with the enactment of
the closing law under the Ordinance of 1787.6
- 9 Ind. 112 (1857). This case was decided under the 1855 closing law, which was enacted
for the "protection of the Sabbath." See note 51 supra.
5, 9 Ind. at 114. The constitutional challenge was raised under IND. CONST. art. 1, § 4, which
is the state provision comparable to the establishment clause. The challenge was unsuccessful
and the provision remains intact today. The forerunner to the 1851 constitution was drafted
in 1816 and contained a similar clause. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1816).
11 The court cited one Indiana case as authority, Reynolds v. Stevenson, 4 Ind. 619 (1853),
which challenged a closing law as inapplicable to a particular activity, the execution of a note,
and one Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 22 Pa. 102 (1853), which involved.
the exception for acts of charity.
'l 33 Ind. 215 (1870).
62 "It is urged that the law under which the prosecution was had is obnoxious to the
Constitution of the State." Id. at 216. Despite this acknowledgment of plaintiff's contention,
the court failed to elaborate on the nature of the constitutional challenge and sustained the
validity of the law.
1, "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." IND. CONST.
art. 1, § 23.
64 "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 State v. Hogriever, 152 Ind. 652, 661, 53 N.E. 921, 924 (1899).
11 See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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The 1905 closing law was challenged, in Carr v. State,6" on specific
allegations that a 1909 amendment to the law had created excep-
tions to the general provisions of the law which were violations of
privileges and immunities and equal protection considerations. 6
The court held that the closing law was constitutional, then
proceded to an examination of the treatment granted such chal-
lenges in Indiana and in other jurisdictions. The conclusion was
inevitable: extreme deference is granted the legislature when re-
viewing the constitutionality of a statute. If there is any reasonable
purpose for the law, it withstands the attack. 9 The dissent took an
opposite view, arguing that the classification created by the 1909
amendment was a specific violation of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. 0 The case is significant because the court impliedly
stated that the closing law could not be sustained by a religious
rationale." Thereafter, case law developed the police power ration-
ale to thwart various attempts to invoke the privileges and immuni-
ties clause.12 By 1958 the supreme court had forgotten that a reli-
gious rationale once existed when it claimed that "Sunday closing
laws have uniformly been justified solely upon the need of man's
body for a day of rest."" Any residual doubt as to the constitution-
ality of the laws as regards equal protection challenges was an-
swered by the United States Supreme Court in 1961.11
During the early developmental stage of Indiana's closing law,
Sunday restrictions on liquor sales were subject to similar changes.
As has been mentioned, such sales were proscribed on Sunday with
an exception made for travelers,7" similar in scope and effect to other
exceptions to the law for various commercial transactions conducted
on Sundays. 6 This exception for travelers was eliminated in 1853.
" 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1911).
" The case concerned a challenge to an exception in the closing law on a theory that it
granted privileges to one class of citizens. Id. at 244-45, 93 N.E. at 1072.
" Id. at 247, 93 N.E. at 1073. See also Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N.E. 862 (1902).
7 Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 264-68, 93 N.E. 1071, 1079-80 (1911) (Myers, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 251, 93 N.E. at 1074 (discussing the basis of a closing law but not expressly stating
that a religious rationale would be improper).
n2 For recent attacks upon state regulations which invoke claims based on a privileges and
immunities clause challenge, see Taxpayers Lobby, Inc. v. Orr, 262 Ind. 92, 311 N.E.2d 814
(1974); City of Ft. Wayne v. Maplewood Park Util., Inc., 143 Ind. App. 507, 241 N.E.2d 805
(1968).
" Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 Ind. 313, 149 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1958). The court made
the statement after recognizing the importance of the religious origin of the closing law. Thus,
regardless of the origin, the Indiana Supreme Court viewed the closing law from a purely
secular, police power perspective.
11 See cases cited note 57 supra.
71 See notes 24-26 & accompanying text supra.
7 The 1817 closing law contained exceptions to the Sunday prohibition of labor for the
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Thereafter, liquor regulations acquired more specific focus. In 1881
the state supreme court found that the public interest required a
limitation on the privilege to retail liquors.77 The court reached this
conclusion without citing precedent or authority, believing it to be
so well accepted that it did not require substantiation. The appar-
ent justification for the Sunday liquor law had become intertwined
with that of the closing law: the police power rationale supported
both.78
Indiana's Rationale for the Sunday Liquor Laws
In order to evaluate a state's reasons for enacting liquor sale re-
strictions, one must first ascertain their nature. Since the Indiana
General Assembly compiles very little legislative history, it is diffi-
cult to discern the purpose of a law or an amendment. Alternative
methods to gain insight into the General Assembly's purpose are
either an investigation of the general purpose clause of the law, if
drafted into the statute, or a survey of the historical context and
trends reflected in the law.
The history of Indiana's Sunday closing and liquor laws reveals
only one permissible purpose for the laws as they existed in 1973;
i.e., a police power rationale.79 Title 7.1 of the Indiana Code contains
such a rationale in its purpose clause.80
operation of ferries and other necessary services. An Act to prevent certain immoral practices,
ch. 32, § 1, 1816-17 Ind. Acts 165 (1817) (repealed 1905). The closing law of 1905 was amended
to permit the playing of baseball and the publishing of newspapers. IND. CODE § 35-1-86-1
(1976) (repealed 1977).
" "The enactment of a law regulating the liquor traffic is an exercise of the police power
of the State." McKinney v. Town of Salem, 77 Ind. 213, 214 (1881). The liquor traffic
regulation at issue in the case was not purely a Sunday regulation; consequently, the discus-
sion of the applicable police power rationale was not conclusive on the issue of its use in the
area of the closing laws. However, the existence of a closing law provided collateral support
for the Sunday restrictions. Thus, only after 1977 could the Sunday restrictions be critically
examined. For other early discussions of state power to regulate liquor traffic, see South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (regulation fully justified under the police
power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (liquor traffic admittedly dangerous to the
health, safety and morals).
"' An attack on a Sunday liquor sales scheme had to surmount the heavy sentiment permit-
ting liquor traffic regulation as part of the state's protection of the public well-being, and
faced the difficult task of overcoming tradition-rich closing law, which validated Sunday
liquor sales prohibitions apart from any other justification for liquor traffic regulation.
7, After 1961, the police power view was self-sustaining, regardless of the earlier religious
connotation of the closing laws. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
90 "The general purposes of the title are: (a) To protect the economic welfare, health, peace
and morals of the people of this state. . . ." IND. CODE § 7.1-1-1-1 (1976). This statement is
consistent with the case law defining the police power. See note 57 & accompanying text
supra.
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Traditionally, the police power rationale for these regulations has
taken two approaches. First, as mentioned above, Sunday has been
considered to be a mandatory day of rest, and thus, the legislature
is empowered to force the closing of businesses and to restrict the
general activities of the people.8" Second, as the Supreme Court has
noted, the intoxicating qualities of liquor and the dangers that ac-
company its consumption subject liquor sales to comprehensive gov-
ernment regulation.2 Arguably, Sunday sale restrictions are de-
signed to limit these dangers and are sustainable as a legitimate
exercise of the police power. The concerns of both approaches were
satisfied prior to the 1973 amendment to Title 7.1.83
REPEAL OF THE CLOSING LAW: ELIMINATION OF THE POLICE POWER
RATIONALE
The 1973 amendment permitting sales of intoxicating liquors for
on-premise consumption presented new issues. In keeping with the
view, expressed in Carr v. State, that exceptions to the closing laws
are possible as society's needs change, and that the police power
must be flexible to meet these needs," the amendments could still
be justified. However, the 1977 repeal of the closing law compels
reexamination of the rationale for the 1973 amendment, which cre-
ated a legislative distinction between sales for on-premise consump-
tion and sales for off-premise consumption.85 The issue now is
whether this distinction is premised on irrational classifications and
thus violative of constitutional concerns or is a valid legislative
attempt to regulate liquor sales.86
81 The repeal of the closing law was not based on judicial voiding of its force or its basis,
thus the constitutionality of such a law remains unquestioned.
u Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 307 (1917). See also Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates,
61 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966).
D The 1973 amendment to Title 7.1 did not in itself raise the issue of the constitutionality
of the Sunday liquor regulations. The existence of the closing law forced an examination of
the scheme to begin with the state's general and well-established power to regulate Sunday
activities. The supplemental retailers' permit, IND. CODE § 7.1-3-16.5-1 (1976), was a valid
exception to the regulation. The repeal of the closing law removed this police power-exception
perspective, and focused attention on liquor regulation as requiring justification independent
of the closing law.
" 178 Ind. 241, 260-61, 93 N.E. 1071, 1077-78 (1911).
IND. CODE §§ 7.1-3-16.5-1 to -6 (1976). The amendment enables an examination of the
regulation scheme based solely on the state's desire to regulate the liquor traffic; any mea-
sures which the state employes in furtherance of its regulations must operate to achieve its
goal of liquor regulation. This is the exact problem in examining the regulation
scheme-without legislative pronouncement of a purpose, it is difficult to evaluate the pro-
priety of the regulations.
" It is well recognized that a license to retail liquor is not a property right. See, e.g., Indiana
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In distinguishing between the two types of sales, the legislature
has favored one type of retailer over another.8 7 Such legislation is
proper only if the classifications are premised upon rational distinc-
tions.M In testing the distinction under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the Indiana Constitution it must be determined
whether the differences created are pertinent to the classification."
If the differences are rational and further a permissible goal of the
legislature, then granting the benefit to a class of retailers by ex-
cepting some sales from the general Sunday prohibition of liquor
sales is a legitimate exercise of the police power."
A challenge based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is tested similarly. The Supreme Court has held that
absent the creation of a "suspect classification" or infringement
upon a "fundamental interest," the state need only show a rational
relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose
to justify the discrimination among classes."
The General Assembly failed to supply an explanation for the
1973 amendment to Title 7.1 which would satisfy the standards
imposed by the federal and state constitutions.2 It is not difficult
to find a reasonably articulable legislative purpose based on the
criteria included in the amendment qualifying a permit holder for
on-premise sales. A restaurant becomes eligible to sell intoxicating
liquors on Sunday provided it satisfies a yearly gross sales require-
Alcoholic Beverage Comm. v. Superior Ct., 233 Ind. 563, 122 N.E.2d 9 (1954); Moore v. City
of Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483, 22 N.E. 424 (1889); Dagley v. Incorporated Town of Fairview
Park, - Ind. App. - , 371 N.E.2d 1338 (1978). Cf. Note, Liquor License-Privilege or
Property?, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 203 (1965) (concluding a license is property for some pur-
poses). But it has also been said that the power to regulate the liquor traffic is subject to
constitutional limitations. In its regulation, the state cannot discriminate against the rights
of citizens. See, e.g., Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
" The two classifications generally distinguish retailers who sell drinks for on-premise
consumption from all other liquor retailers; however, in operation, the classification scheme
separates restaurants and clubs qualifying for the supplemental retailer's permit from pack-
aged retailers, taverns, restaurants and clubs not qualifying for the special permit.
" Forks v. City of Warsaw, 257 Ind. 237, 273 N.E.2d 856 (1971); In re Pisello, 155 Ind. App.
484, 293 N.E.2d 228 (1973).
, Heninger v. Police Comm'r, 161 Ind. App. 72, 314 N.E.2d 827 (1974).
9 See id.; American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal & Food Comm'r, 268 F. 563 (D.C.
Ind. 1920).
," Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental
right issue; strict scrutiny standard). But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (state
regulatory statute not required to apply to all persons engaged in the same business).
92 A statutory amendment is subject to the purpose clause drafted for the subject area;
however, it behooves a legislature to clarify its intention when enacting a major change in
the scheme of the regulations. The General Assembly did not provide any such clarification
for the 1973 amendment.
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ment and that fifty percent of those transactions are in retail sales
of food. 3 The latter requirement indicates that the legislature in-
tended establishments qualifying for permits to be restaurants serv-
ing cocktails with meals and not taverns that only served a nominal
amount of food. The Sunday sale of liquors is thus a "food service."
Under this view, the classification of types of sales before 1977 was
arguably rational: the General Assembly continued to regulate the
liquor traffic through a general prohibition of Sunday retail sales,
compatible with the "day of rest" approach of the closing law, and,
excepted certain sales from the prohibition as a service to Sunday
diners."
In the six years since the Sunday liquor laws were amended to
permit the Sunday sales there has not been a challenge to the regu-
lations. This is not surprising. The power of the General Assembly
to regulate the liquor traffic has been a fact of life in Indiana since
the origin of the territory. 5 Similarly, closing laws have long been
accepted, surviving as a legislative concept for over 1600 years. In
Indiana, the closing law was not repealed until after the change in
the Sunday liquor laws. A serious challenge to the classification
could not have been made until after the repeal in 1977.11
Now after this repeal, and with it the removal of the "Sunday is
a day of rest" rationale, the distinction between on-premise sales
and off-premise sales could be sustained only if rationally related
to the remaining police power for regulating the liquor traffic, i.e.,
the special characteristics of liquor." An examination of the actual
effects of the classification, however, indicates a lack of such ra-
tional relationship.
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IN THE CURRENT SUNDAY SALES LAW
The standards used to gauge legislation against Indiana's privi-
leges and immunities clause and against the fourteenth amendment
are extremely liberal. A court will avoid "legislating" and will seek
to uphold a challenged statute as long as a mere rational relation-
ship exists between the exercise of the police power and the goal or
Is IND. CODE § 7.1-3-16.5-2 (1976).
,1 This view is well within keeping of the other amendments to the closing law. See IND.
CODE § 35-1-86-1 (1976) (repealed 1977).
" See notes 24-35 & accompanying text supra.
" See notes 83, 85 & accompanying text supra.
To sustain the present regulatory scheme, a justification must be found which focuses
upon the nature of intoxicating liquors; otherwise, there is no possible justification for the
legislature to permit certain sales and consumption of liquor on Sundays while prohibiting
other forms of retail.
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purpose of the statute.98 Thus it becomes necessary to examine the
restrictions on the Sunday sales of liquor and the result produced.
The actual consumption of alcoholic beverages on Sunday is not
unlawful, either in the privacy of one's home or in any public area
where consumption is legal on other days. The prohibition of pack-
aged liquor sales does not address itself to consumption of packaged
liquors, only sales. Thus, the consumer is merely forced to purchase
on another day that liquor which he desires to drink on Sunday.
Therefore, the Sunday law is not designed to regulate the behavior
of the consumer, as it relates to consumption, " but regulates that
of the retailer as it relates to the act of selling.
Similarly, if it is the act of selling liquor which is the subject of
legislative concern, as was the case with the general closing law,",
excepting sales by the drink for consumption on the premises is not
a proper exception to the general prohibition of Sunday liquor
sales;"' there is nothing inherently harmful in packaged liquor sales
which is not also present in single drink sales. This is not to say that
the legislature could not, or even that it has not, found some recog-
nizeable harmful aspect in sales of liquor on Sunday, but it is sug-
gested that whatever hypothetical danger exists in one type of sale
must also exist in the other.
Further, as far as the purchaser of liquor is concerned, on-premise
sales are not necessarily "supplemental" to a restaurant's serving
food on Sunday, because there is no requirement that the customer
also buy food at the restaurant as a prerequisite to obtaining al-
cholic beverages.102 Even more troublesome are the criteria to be
satisfied prior to qualifying for the supplemental retailers' permit.
This statutory standard computes the gross sales requirement on a
yearly basis and a restaurant is not required to sell any minimum
amount of food on Sunday in order to qualify. ' In other words, the
restaurant could enjoy a purely liquor traffic on Sunday while con-
" The issue of whether or not a court will "legislate" or defer to the wisdom of the people's
body politic is a much discussed topic. For the purposes of this note, the statement that a
court will strive to uphold a constitutionally challenged statute, Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241,
247, 93 N.E. 1071, 1073 (1911), is accepted as the probable view of a court hearing a challsnge
to the liquor regulations.
11 The retail regulations address the act of retailing, not of consuming.
100 The closing law addressed in broad terms all commercial activities, then established
exceptions. See notes 24-26, 74-76 & accompanying text supra.
"I' The alcoholic beverage title is written with a general Sunday sales prohibition, but
includes a particular exception from that restriction; therefore, the burden is on the state to
demonstrate a rational relation between the exception and the apparent purpose of the
general regulatory scheme.
"I2 See IND. CODE § 7.1-3-16.5-1 (1976).
103 Id. § 7.1-3-16.5-2.
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tinuing to qualify for the permit. In addition, the legislature effec-
tively discounted a food service rationale by statute in 1975. Public
Law 60 did not address liquor sales by clubs. Subsequently, in 1975
Public Law 72 authorized a club holding a liquor sales permit to sell
alcoholic beverages for on-premise consumption on one Sunday in
each calendar quarter. °0 This statute was amended in 1977 to per-
mit such sales one Sunday each month.' 5 Significantly, there is not
a minimum food sale prerequisite for a club to qualify for the Sun-
day permit, as there is for a restaurant.' 6
Finally, the prohibition of off-premise sales is not a logical effort
to reduce the number of Sunday drivers who might have been drink-
ing. On the contrary, persons not foresighted enough to purchase
their liquor on another day, to drink at home on Sunday, must do
their drinking in public and then make their way home, which is
likely to increase the number of drunk drivers on the road.
The above examination of the result of the 1973 amendment fo-
cuses primarily on what the purchaser would view as its effect. The
seller has a wholly different concern. A tavern owner depends upon
the very traffic affected by this amendment for his livelihood.',, He
is hard-pressed to see the rationale of the distinction between his
sales by the drink and those permitted by a holder of the supple-
mental retailers' permit."8 In 1881 the Indiana Supreme Court ad-
dressed a challenge to the closing law when a motel owner sold
cigars on Sunday, which was contrary to the law, because the sale
did not qualify as an act of necessity for the purpose of the statutory
exception."' A tavern owner today finds the court's view very simi-
lar to his own: permitting the motel owner to sell cigars to his
patrons would permit him to achieve an "odious and intolerable
monopoly" because other such businesses are closed by law."0 The
I" An Act to amend IC 1971, 7.1-3-20 concerning alcoholic beverages, Pub. L. No. 72, 1975
Ind. Acts 563 (current version at IND. CODE § 7.1-3-20-2 (1976)).
' IND. CODE § 7.1-3-20-2 (1976).
IN The sections defining a club do not contain references to a minimum volume of food sales
required to obtain a permit. See IND. CODE §§ 7.1-3-20-1 to -8 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
I The legitimate concern of the tavern-owner is the loss of his steady clientele to the
restaurant "down the street" because the opportunity to purchase liquor on Sundays operates
to alter the "habits" of the individuals.
In The restaurant qualifies for the permit based upon its gross food sales; however, since
the computation of the required gross sales is not limited to Sunday sales, IND. CODE § 7.1-3-
16.5-2 (1976), the Sunday sales by the restaurant to the non-food purchasing consumer are
indistinguishable from the tavern's weekday sales.
"*, Mueller v. State, 76 Ind. 311 (1881). See also Carver v. State, 69 Ind. 61 (1879) (hotel
owner selling cigars on Sunday violated the closing law because patrons were not travelers,
and thus not within the exception).
"1 76 Ind. at 314.
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tavern owner could reasonably ask what is the danger in his sales
by the drink severe enough to warrant the legislative classification
which is not present in the sales by a restaurant or, more perplex-
ingly, in the sales by a club.
AVOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
The General Assembly has several alternative solutions to the
current problem of a lack of a rational relation between purpose and
effect. First, a repeal of the 1973 amendment which created the
classification would eliminate the issue. This solution is unlikely
considering the lobbying strength of various interest groups which
supported the amendment."' Second, the Sunday restriction for off-
premise sales could be eliminated. This solution is logical since
there has not been demonstrated a cogent reason for continuing to
prohibit these sales. Such a change is unlikely due to the pervasive
history of liquor regulation in Indiana and the restrictions on Sun-
day sales which have been an integral part of that denouement.
Furthermore, the legislature arguably fears the effect of such unin-
hibited sales upon the packaged liquor retailer, consistent with the
concern expressed for retailers of motor vehicles.1 Third, the legis-
lature could reexamine the reasons used to justify the classification
of types of sales and develop an articulable purpose for the regula-
tions which is consistent with the effect, if any exists.
The preferable option would be to amend the current regulations
to eliminate the problems. The food service rationale is a valid
concern. There is nothing inherently wrong with serving alcoholic
beverages in conjunction with serving food. It is difficult to measure
the effect of Sunday liquor sales as an inducement for conference
and exposition business within the state, but presumably, out-of-
state groups considering Indiana as a situs for weekend conferences
are influenced by the opportunity to imbibe on Sundays; obviously,
the attracting of additional revenue to the state is a valid legislative
"I The Indiana Restaurant Association lobbied for passage of the 1973 amendment; due
to the paucity of the legislative history concerning the amendment, it is not possible to
document the extent of the Association's influence.
,,I n Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E.2d 808 (1958), the court recognized
the legislature's concern for the retailer of motor vehicles and acknowledged the fear that
permitting Sunday retail sales would permit the smaller retailer to be forced into Sunday
hours in order to compete with the larger retailers. Further, the court exhibited an awareness
of the buying habits of consumers and the heavy concentration of Sunday sales. It concluded
-that the small retailer could not realistically choose to be closed on Sunday. These concerns
have never been expressed as regards the liquor traffic; such explanation would go a long way
in providing an indication of the legislative purpose for the restrictions.
[Vol. 55:191
SUNDAY-LIQUOR LAWS
concern. However, if the gross sales requirement is to be of any real
significance, then the computations must be based upon Sunday
sales alone. This is the time of concern, therefore, it must be the
time during which the restaurant qualifies. Administratively, it re-
quires little added effort to segregate the sales figures for Sundays
from those of the balance of the week.13 In this same vein, the sales
by a club are clearly not intended to satisfy any food service ration-
ale and must be eliminated. The criteria which must be met in order
to be a club and to obtain a liquor permit do not address the same
concerns as the prohibition of Sunday liquor sales or any exceptions
therein.
If the exception for clubs is retained it is subject to abuse. In only
two years the permissible Sunday sale days were tripled."' There is
nothing in the current law to prevent these sale days from being
expanded to include every Sunday. If the club authorized to engage
in such sales is one of limited membership, than an attack is possi-
ble, based on the granting of a privilege to a class of citizens;115 if
the membership is open and not selective, then the distinction be-
tween the club and the local tavern is near impossible to make, with
only the intangible club "atmosphere" absent from the tavern. If it
is the special "atmosphere" of a club which lends itself to Sunday
liquor sales, separate from any food sales, then there is no limit in
terms of members, nature of the patronage or type of atmosphere
which will characterize a tavern.118 Thus, the local bar becomes the
local club and the Sunday sales restriction operates only to exclude
packaged sales. Without legislative delineation of the purpose for
the Sunday restriction and the corresponding exceptions, the limi-
tations will eventually become inoperable.
CONCLUSION
It is conceivable that the lack of a proper rationale for the current
Sunday liquor laws will not be considered a problem of sufficient
13 A similar possibility would be to require that the consumer of the alcoholic beverage also
consume some quantity of food. Such a provision, however, would be administratively unfeas-
ible, though appropriate in a pure "food service" rationale.
" See notes 104-06 & accompanying text supra.
,, In such a club, the granting of the privilege to purchase alcoholic beverages on Sunday
would be an inherent right of anyone satisfying the membership requirements; however, such
"right" would be subject to the minimum drinking age established by law, which is not a
requirement for club membership.
"I Similar to the need for a legislative statement as to the purpose of the 1973 amendment,
there should be a statement of the intention of the legislature when it enacted the club
amendments. Both explanations would aid in resolving the issue of improper regulation.
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magnitude to warrant any changes. Such a view would not be unu-
sual: the evolution of liquor regulation has been a slow and ponder-
ous process throughout Indiana's history; and, the current system
has been unchallenged to date. However, such a view would also be
grossly in error. The failure of the General Assembly to act prospec-
tively to cure the ills of the current law, prior to an equal protection
challenge or one based on the privileges and immunities clause,
might possibly result in a judicial voiding of the 1973 amendment.
At best, it would be a senseless waste of time and money to force
such a battle to the courts. Legislative foresight can bring about
some needed changes now and with little effort. Whether a court
would simply void the 1973 amendment or go on to address the
entire classification scheme of liquor regulations ought to be a real
subject of concern to the legislature. Public sentiment runs hot in
issues of liquor regulation and it is the public's representatives who
are not only empowered but also obligated to determine the course
of such regulations.
Michael Lee Carmin
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